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Abstract
Background: Impact assessment (IA) of all major European Union (EU) policies is now mandatory. The form of IA used has
been criticised for favouring corporate interests by overemphasising economic impacts and failing to adequately assess
health impacts. Our study sought to assess how, why, and in what ways corporations, and particularly the tobacco industry,
influenced the EU’s approach to IA.
Methods and Findings: In order to identify whether industry played a role in promoting this system of IA within the EU, we
analysed internal documents from British American Tobacco (BAT) that were disclosed following a series of litigation cases
in the United States. We combined this analysis with one of related literature and interviews with key informants. Our
analysis demonstrates that from 1995 onwards BAT actively worked with other corporate actors to successfully promote a
business-oriented form of IA that favoured large corporations. It appears that BAT favoured this form of IA because it could
advance the company’s European interests by establishing ground rules for policymaking that would: (i) provide an
economic framework for evaluating all policy decisions, implicitly prioritising costs to businesses; (ii) secure early corporate
involvement in policy discussions; (iii) bestow the corporate sector with a long-term advantage over other actors by
increasing policymakers’ dependence on information they supplied; and (iv) provide businesses with a persuasive means of
challenging potential and existing legislation. The data reveal that an ensuing lobbying campaign, largely driven by BAT,
helped secure binding changes to the EU Treaty via the Treaty of Amsterdam that required EU policymakers to minimise
legislative burdens on businesses. Efforts subsequently focused on ensuring that these Treaty changes were translated into
the application of a business orientated form of IA (cost–benefit analysis [CBA]) within EU policymaking procedures. Both
the tobacco and chemical industries have since employed IA in apparent attempts to undermine key aspects of European
policies designed to protect public health.
Conclusions: Our findings suggest that BAT and its corporate allies have fundamentally altered the way in which all EU
policy is made by making a business-oriented form of IA mandatory. This increases the likelihood that the EU will produce
policies that advance the interests of major corporations, including those that produce products damaging to health, rather
than in the interests of its citizens. Given that the public health community, focusing on health IA, has largely welcomed the
increasing policy interest in IA, this suggests that urgent consideration is required of the ways in which IA can be employed
to undermine, as well as support, effective public health policies.
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Introduction
Increasingly, many of the world’s major public health concerns
are linked to the goods produced and marketed by large
corporations (such as those in the fast food, alcohol, tobacco, and
chemical industries) [1]. Understanding how corporations influence
policy therefore forms an essential part of public health research.
Efforts to understand the behaviour of the tobacco industry, which
is widely recognised as the vector of the tobacco epidemic [2–5],
have been greatly facilitated by the release of internal corporate
documents through a series of litigation cases in the United States.
To date, research based on these documents has largely focused on
industry efforts to influence tobacco control policy [6–14], and less
attention has paid to what these documents reveal about collective
efforts by corporations to influence broader policy debates. Our
research sought to assess how, why, and in what ways corporations,
particularly the tobacco industry, influenced the EU’s approach to
impact assessment (IA), by employing this unique resource. Policy
theorists have long highlighted the importance of policy networks in
achieving policy change [15–17], but there have been very few
attempts (perhaps because of the difficulties in obtaining relevant
data) to unpack how such networks are created. This paper offers
some unique insights into the extent to which policy networks can be
deliberately manufactured by sufficiently resourced actors and used
to influence policy. It starts by introducing IA, the concerns around
its use and its application within the EU.
The Rise of IA as a Policymaking Tool
IA is used as a tool for evaluating potential legislative changes.
Advocates claim it helps ensure that policy decisions are more
transparent, rational [18–20], scientific [21], and democratic [20].
IA may incorporate a form of risk assessment (RA) (see Table 1) to
assess whether the risks of a potential hazard are great enough to
warrant regulation [22,23]. Once a consensus has been reached
about the need for action, the main IA tool is used to assess the
potential impacts of different policy options as a way to inform
decisions about the best way forward. Mirroring cost-benefit
analysis (CBA), the methodology of IA is often understood to
require all potential ‘‘costs’’ and ‘‘benefits’’ to be identified,
converted into monetary units, and compared to determine the
socially optimal policy option [24]. In practice, however, IA is
often implemented more flexibly and does not necessarily involve
the monetisation or quantification of all impacts [24,25].
Criticisms of IA
A large body of work critiquing the use of IA and CBA within
policymaking (largely in the US) suggests that, rather than
promoting transparency or rationality, these tools obfuscate
political decisions concerning the prioritisation of interests in
policy [26–28]. Various types of IA have been developed,
including environmental impact assessment, sustainability impact
assessment, health impact assessment (HIA), health equity impact
Table 1. The regulatory reforms BAT pursued.
Aspect of
Regulatory
Reform Description BAT’s Interest
Risk assessment A means of assessing the potential risk posed by a particular
hazard. In a policy context, RA is designed to help inform decisions
about whether legislative intervention is required to help manage a
particular risk. It is thus usually undertaken early in the
policymaking process.
From 1995 onwards, internal documents suggest senior managers at BAT
believed a requirement for structured RA could be used to prevent
legislation relating to ETS and tobacco advertising [268]. It recruited other
companies involved in producing or marketing risky products to coalitions
that worked together to attempt to redefine policymakers’ approach to risk
in the EU [62,107].
Precautionary
principle
The principle that, where there are reasonable grounds to believe that
a given hazard would, if it occurred, result in severe or irreversible
damage to the public’s health or the environment, calls on policy-
makers to act to prevent that risk, even where there is not yet a
scientific consensus about its likely occurrence and/or impact.
The companies involved in the above campaign were concerned about how
the precautionary principle was being interpreted and employed by
policymakers in the EU. Hence, in addition to trying to promote a form of RA
that would work to businesses’ advantage, they attempted to try to influence
how this principle was understood and applied in the EU [107,137].
Impact
assessment
IAs are used as planning tools to inform and improve decision or
policymaking processes. They usually aim to assess the likely effects
of potential options in advance of their implementation. A variety of
types of impact assessment exist, each focusing on different kinds of
impacts, including ones relating to the environment, sustainability,
inequality, health, social, and business interests.
BAT became interested in how IAs in Europe might be used to its advantage
in the mid-1990s. By this point, a weak form of business IA had already been
officially introduced in the European Community but had failed to
significantly change the way in which policy was made [38,269]. As this paper
demonstrates, BAT subsequently recruited and contracted others to help it
promote a requirement for IA that would work in its interests.
Business impact
assessment
A form of IA that focuses on the impacts of potential policies on
businesses. Fiche d’Impact was the first form of BIA introduced
into the European Community in 1986 [270], but this system
was limited and failed to significantly change the way in
which European legislation developed [38,269].
BIA is the form of IA that BAT was involved in promoting. The company
perceived BIA to be a means of ensuring policymakers consulted with
industry and took the potential costs of legislation to businesses into
account when developing policy recommendations. In addition, it was seen
as a way of pushing for structured risk assessment (see above) [87,97,100].
Cost-benefit
analysis
A form of impact assessment that focuses on assessing potential
costs and benefits of policies. Developed by economists, CBA
usually requires costs and benefits to be quantified and converted
into monetary terms [93,251].
BAT largely used the term CBA, rather than IA, indicating that the kind of IA
the company was interested in pursuing involved employing quantifiable
(and, where possible, economic) impacts. Having been advised that
qualitative benefits are often more difficult to assess than quantifiable costs
[93], BAT was aware that a requirement to quantify might work to their
advantage.
Stakeholder
consultation
The basic idea that all those with an interest in a particular issue
should be consulted. Interpretations of who constitutes a
‘‘stakeholder’’ vary. For example, the tobacco industry could be
perceived as a key stakeholder in tobacco control policy or, in
contrast, as a ‘‘vested interest.’’
BAT appears to have been particularly keen to achieve a statutory
requirement for policymakers to consult with potentially affected businesses
at a very early stage in the policymaking process [62,160]. This may be partly
because tobacco companies were finding themselves increasingly excluded
from policymaking discussions [271].
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000202.t001
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assessment, and business impact assessment (BIA), each of which
focuses on different kinds of impacts and is likely to lead to
different conclusions about the best way forward. Hence, the
decision to employ particular forms of IA and not others involves a
political and ethical judgment about the criteria against which
public policy should be assessed. Critics of IA/CBA suggest that
this framing effect tends to privilege the interests of large
corporations over other policy stakeholders (such as NGOs and
public interest groups) in the following four ways. First, because it
is easier to predict the more direct ‘‘costs’’ of regulations to
business than the diffuse and long-term potential benefits for
populations or the environment, costs to businesses may be over-
represented [29]. Second, because much of the information
policymakers need to assess impacts on companies is held by the
companies concerned, there is a possibility that companies may
share only the information that promotes their interests [30–32].
Third, the process of attaching monetised values to all predicted
impacts (often regarded as necessary to facilitate the aggregation of
dissimilar impacts) [20,22,33] is problematic because there is no
agreed way of valuing some of the most fundamental impacts, such
as lives saved [22,28,34,35]. Fourth, IA provides a means for
stakeholders to continually challenge, and thus delay, decisions
with which they disagree [36].
How Does IA Currently Operate in Europe?
Although the then European Community committed itself to
employing a form of BIA known as Fiche d’Impact in 1986 [37], this
was never fully embedded [38]. It is only since the 1997 Treaty of
Amsterdam [39] provided a constitutional basis for IA [40] that IA
has really begun to change policymaking in the EU and, in so
doing, has put the European Commission, along with the UK, at
the forefront of the drive for IA within Europe [41]. Since 2002,
the European Commission (the main originator of legislation in
the EU political process) has developed an approach to IA which
ostensibly involves an ‘‘integrated’’ version of IA and aims to assess
impacts in the three underlying areas (‘pillars’) of EU policy
(economic, environmental, and social issues) [42–44]. The
European Commission describes its IA tool as ‘‘a thorough and
balanced appraisal of all impacts’’ [42]. However, independent
assessments of the IAs it has produced claim that coverage across
the three pillars is uneven, with economic impacts receiving the
most attention [43,44]. Health impacts (largely subsumed within
the ‘‘social’’ pillar) have received particularly limited attention
[45–47]; a review of the 137 IAs carried out by the European
Commission in 2005 and 2006 found that more than half did not
even mention the word ‘‘health’’ [45]. This is so despite the fact
that Article 152 of the EU Treaty explicitly states that ‘‘a high level
of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and
implementation of all Community policies and activities’’ [39], a
statement that has been interpreted as requiring HIA for all EU
policies [48]. Furthermore, it has been argued that IA in the EU is
increasingly being interpreted as a means of achieving less, not
necessarily better, regulation [44,49]. The concerns raised by the
reviews of the European Commission’s recent IAs are consistent
with a growing literature (summarised above) that suggests IA is
most likely to benefit business.
Objectives of the Study
Our analysis examines how, why, and in what ways corpora-
tions, particularly the tobacco industry, influenced the EU’s
approach to IA. We consider how IA has been, and is being, used
by regulated industries in their attempts to influence EU policy. In
order to explore these questions, we examined internal tobacco
industry documents, combined with existing literature concerning
IA and CBA, and undertook a series of interviews with relevant
European informants.
Methods
Following a series of litigation cases in the US, leading tobacco
companies were required to make internal documents public [50].
These are now available online and can be searched using optical
character recognition [51]. Their broad coverage means they also
provide insights into the lobbying efforts of companies that worked
with the tobacco industry, providing a unique resource for the
analysis of corporate strategy and conduct.
We took an iterative approach to searching the tobacco
documents, with broad initial search terms on tobacco industry
attempts to influence European regulatory reform being used to
generate more specific terms. Twenty-two initial search terms were
used, including: ‘‘Better Regulation’’; ‘‘cost-benefit’’ AND ‘‘eu*’’;
‘‘Impact assessment’’ AND (‘‘Eu*’’ OR ‘‘EC’’ OR ‘‘EP’’); ‘‘risk
assessment’’ AND ‘‘Eu*’’; ‘‘sensible regulation’’ AND ‘‘Eu*’’.
Further specific search terms relating to particular texts,
individuals, companies, lobbying and consultancy firms, trade
organizations, networks, events, and places were then developed
via the analyses of these documents. Some search terms were
combined into search strings to minimize the number of
documents returned in multiple searches.
We undertook our searches between mid-April and September
2008, initially using the BAT Document Archive (http://bat.
library.ucsf.edu/) and, from July 2008, the newly integrated
Legacy online library (http://www.legacy-library.ucsf.edu). The
search strategy focused almost entirely on BAT internal docu-
ments, because preliminary searches of the internal documents of
other tobacco companies indicated that it was the key tobacco
corporation involved in the promotion of IA in Europe. In total,
5,677 documents were identified and reviewed. Where documents
appeared particularly interesting or referred to other documents of
interest, consecutive Bates numbers were searched. This method
increased the total number of documents reviewed to just under
6,800. Of these, 714 were identified as relevant to BAT’s attempts
to influence regulatory reforms in Europe. These documents were
imported to an EndNote library, from where they were re-read,
interpreted, and thematically coded by an experienced qualitative
researcher (KS).
The analysis of these documents was contextualised using
secondary sources, including interviews with relevant individuals.
Potential interviewees were identified via existing contacts known
to the research team and other colleagues working in tobacco
control, analyses of textual documents and recommendations by
other interviewees. In total, 16 interviews were undertaken (four
interviewees worked for European NGOs with an interest in
public health, four were independent consultants or worked at
relevant think tanks, and eight worked, or had previously worked,
at the European Commission). After obtaining written consent, all
interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed before being
discussed within the research team and thematically analysed by
an experienced qualitative researcher. In addition, electronic
searches of the following sources was undertaken: Nexis (an
electronic database of mass media publications); online databases
of academic publications; Europa (the EU’s Web site); Web sites of
lobbying, consultancy, and trade organizations cited in the
documents; accounts/transcripts of parliamentary debates (in the
UK and EU); and public health and environmental NGO Web
sites. This paper focuses primarily on the data produced by
analysing BAT’s internal documents but, by using the interview
transcripts and the additional textual information to look for
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corroborating and conflicting evidence, we were able to offset
some of the weaknesses inherent in document-based research
[52,53] and examine the ongoing impacts of the findings. Where
the results described below are informed by interview data, this is
specifically indicated; in all other cases, the results are based on an
analysis of the cited documents. Interviewees are named only
where consent was obtained to do so. The methodological
approach was approved by the University of Bath’s School for
Health Research Ethics Committee.
Results
The Rationale Underlying the Push for Risk Assessment
and IA
Following the failure of the Fiche d’Impact system to develop [54],
in the mid-1990s BAT began to seriously consider lobbying for
what it termed structured risk assessment (RA) within a framework
of BIA/CBA [55–58]. Our analysis reveals that BAT saw RA as a
means of precluding the introduction of public smoking restric-
tions [56,59] which it saw as a growing threat in Europe
[56,60,61]. It also appears that preventing tobacco advertising
restrictions was thought to be another outcome [62]. BAT
documents reveal that senior managers at the company had
learnt that RA could be used in this way from US tobacco
company Philip Morris [63–65], and its proposed strategy
followed Philip Morris’ campaign to redefine RA so that it could
be used to challenge, rather than support, the classification of
environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) as a group A (human)
carcinogen [66]. BAT had links to two US legal firms, Shook
Hardy and Bacon [63–65,67–70] and Covington & Burling
[71,72], that had been involved in the US campaign [73]. Notably,
Christopher Proctor, formerly a senior research scientist at BAT
[74], had worked for Covington & Burling during this period
[75–77] and, on return to BAT in 1994 [78,79], was asked by a
colleague (Stuart Chalfen, a solicitor at BAT [80]) to produce an
overview of Philip Morris’ approach to regulatory issues [81,82].
The UK consultancy firm Charles Barker appears to have then
been asked to outline the advantages for BAT of embedding RA
within UK and European policymaking processes and advised that
BAT would need to tread carefully, lobbying through a ‘‘front’’
organisation and enlisting other ‘‘big industry names in support’’
[83]. The chemical and pharmaceutical industries were highlight-
ed as other sectors likely to benefit from (and therefore support
calls for) the kind of RA BAT was seeking [83]. In line with this
advice, BAT’s recruitment efforts appeared to focus solely on
companies manufacturing regulated products [55]. By autumn
1996, BAT had commenced discussions with a range of other
companies, including SmithKline Beecham, Zeneca, Shell, British
Petroleum and Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), about a
campaign to promote RA and IA/CBA as mandatory processes
for all proposed EU regulation [57,58,84] (for more details about
the companies that became involved to varying degrees, see
Table 2). Stuart Chalfen (BAT) claimed there was ‘‘a real
possibility that, with push from around the EU by interested
companies, particularly through their trade associations, a basis
will be established on which structured risk assessment within cost
benefit analysis could be established as the paradigm for European
regulation in the future’’ [57]. He went on to argue that such a
development would represent a ‘‘remarkable step forward for the
future of our companies’’ [57].
BAT thereby ignored Charles Barker’s warnings that ‘‘eventual
guidelines might work against rather than help the tobacco
industry’s interests,’’ as they could be ‘‘hijacked by other lobbies,’’
such as environmental campaigners, and ‘‘might further confirm
the hazards of ETS’’ [83]. The company seemed to be aware that
RA might work against its interests [85] but it appears that, by
driving the agenda, BAT hoped to ensure that decisions about
how much risk is acceptable were based on a methodological
approach that would work in its favour [56,86].
A proposal from Covington & Burling in February 1996 advised
that existing (relatively weak) commitments to IA in Europe could
be used to promote a far more specific form of BIA, intended to
ensure that new legislation could only be implemented if it could
be demonstrated to ‘‘achieve significant risk reductions at
reasonable cost’’ [87]. In other words, as well as providing a
‘‘policy window’’ through which RA could be promoted [88], the
use of IA/CBA as a framework for RA involved promoting a tool
in which reductions in risks to human health (and the
environment) would be partially assessed on the basis of their
economic efficiency. Further potential strategic value of IA (as
opposed to RA) is set out in promotional material of IMPACT, a
group specialising in IAs that was formed by a UK consultancy
group called the Public Policy Unit (PPU) and business economists
London Economics [89], which BAT kept on its files [89–92].
After stating that IA, ‘‘offers business and industry a major new
opportunity to influence the policy and legislative process’’ [91],
IMPACT claimed that companies could use IA to ‘‘work the
system’’ by: (i) opposing or amending policy proposals; (ii)
promoting industry’s legislative or regulatory proposals; and (iii)
challenging government to review existing regulatory or legislative
burdens [91]. The document goes on to suggest that IA can also be
used to ensure early consultation with business, to direct policy-
makers to industry’s preferred sources of data, and to delay or
block legislation [91]. Significantly, IMPACT’s material also
suggests that businesses might be able to influence the method-
ologies of official IAs [91], a possibility also highlighted in a report
for BAT by Ernst & Young, one of the world’s largest consultancy
firms [93]. It is unclear from the data whether BAT first suggested
to PPU that IA provided a potential means for corporate policy
influence or vice versa. In either case, BAT seems to have been
persuaded by IMPACT/PPU’s pitch because, in addition to
enlisting PPU to undertake a BIA on its behalf [94–96], BAT
subsequently launched a large-scale and multifaceted campaign
aimed at shaping policy approaches to IA in the UK and
Europe [97].
Manufacturing a Supportive Policy Network
The analysis of BAT’s internal documents indicates that the
preliminary aim of BAT’s campaign was to make RA and CBA
legally binding within EU policymaking by securing changes to the
EU Treaty [98]. To this end it was deemed necessary to create ‘‘a
large reservoir of informed and favourable opinion towards the
project across the EU’’ [99] at both national and European levels.
In seeking to achieve this, from 1996 onwards BAT appears to
have relied heavily on the European Policy Centre (EPC)
[62,98,100–115], sometimes working with the Weinberg Group
[116–118], a US based consultancy firm that had also been
involved in Philip Morris’ US and international ETS campaign
[73,119–125]. The EPC (originally Belmont EPC, referred to in
some documents as ‘‘Belmont’’) is a leading Brussels think tank
[126], which Stanley Crossick helped establish in 1991 [127] (BAT
had been in contact with Crossick since the late 1980s [128–133])
and BAT remains a member today [134].
It seems clear that BAT approached the EPC, which then
formed the Risk Assessment Forum (herein referred to as the
Forum) on behalf of BAT and its allies, and that both BAT and
EPC were then involved in recruiting further companies to join the
Forum and thus the broader campaign for regulatory reform (see
Working the System
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Table 2 for companies that became involved and/or participated
in email discussions about the campaign) ([135,136]; interview
with Stanley Crossick on 18th September 2008). Documents
summarising the collective intention of the Forum suggest that its
members hoped to promote a new approach to assessing risk that
would reduce policymakers’ ability to use the precautionary
principle (see Table 1) as a basis for EU legislation [107,137]. For
example, one document explains that the Forum ‘‘should attempt
to define the principles which must be applied to the process of
governance of risk rather than leave it to the decision-makers’’
[107].
In recruiting the EPC and expanding the coalition of
corporations, BAT’s aim appears to have been to deliberately
manufacture a supportive ‘‘policy network’’ [15–17], thereby
increasing both the credibility and the size of the campaign, and
obfuscating the tobacco industry’s specific interests in risk
assessment [83,138]. The value of EPC assuming a central role
in the campaign to promote IA and RA resides in its perceived
Table 2. Other companies involved in the campaign to achieve regulatory reforms in Europe.
Companies (other than BAT) Which Were Members of the EPC
Risk Assessment Forum and/or Which Participated in EPC Risk
Assessment Forum Events [55,58,99,107,113,272]
Business Groups and Companies (Other than BAT) That Were Involved in
Fair Regulation Campaign Meetings and/or Email Discussions [205,214]
N Baxter Business & other groups:
N Bayer N British Chambers of Commerce
N Bouygues N Confederation of British Industry (CBI)
N Coca Cola N Engineering Employers Federation
N Dow N Federation of Small Businesses
N Du Pont de Nemours N National Council for Voluntary Organisations
N Edelman N UK Offshore Operators Association
N Elf Aquitaine Companies:
N GCPF (Crop Protection Association) N British Telecom (BT)
N HSBC N British Aerospace
N Imperial Chemicals Company (ICI) N British Airways
N Johnson & Johnson N British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL)
N Marks & Spencer N Carlton
N Mars N Chantrey Vellacott
N NatWest N Clifford Chance
N Pirelli N Coge´ma (now part of AREVA NC)
N Shell* N Covington & Burling
N Siemens N Diageo
N SmithKline Beecham N Enron
N Solvay N ICI
N Tesco N KPMG
N Zeneca* N Linklaters & Alliance
N Lovell White Durrant
N Mobil
N NTL (National Transcommunications Limited)
N Proctor & Gamble
N Rolls Royce
N Telewest
N Unilever
N United News & Media
N Zurich financial services
*Companies that were working with BAT on this campaign from an early stage [55].
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000202.t002
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status as an independent and highly credible policy actor, which
meant the campaign for regulatory reform was far more likely to
seem convincing to policymakers:
‘‘I would be absolutely astonished and would find it very
difficult to believe if there was any information available
which tended to indicate that the EPC was advocating on
behalf of the tobacco industry—that would be shocking.’’
(Interview with David Byrne, Commissioner for Health and
Consumer Protection 1999–2004, 27th August 2008)
Securing Changes to the EU Treaty
To ensure that RA and CBA became legal requirements in EU
policymaking [56,62], our analysis demonstrates that the cam-
paign had to move quickly to influence the EU Treaty via the
1996–1997 Inter-governmental Conference (IGC) [100] (IGCs are
the lengthy process via which Member States consider changes to
the EU Treaty and the 1996–1997 IGC culminated in the Treaty
of Amsterdam [39]). In seeking to influence this process, BAT and
the Forum appear to have exploited the multiple entry points that
characterise EU policymaking [139]. The companies involved (see
Table 2) acted directly, through various third party organisations
(such as the EPC and PPU), and through business organisations
such as UNICE (Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confeder-
ations of Europe, now known as BusinessEurope) and the CBI (the
Confederation of British Industry), as well as the IBEC (Irish
Business and Employers Federation), which was another member
of UNICE [98,105,140–145]. BAT’s internal documents indicate
that the company was a paying member of the CBI [146–151] and
that BAT staff held key CBI posts, such as sitting on and chairing
various CBI committees [151–154]. UNICE, which is now known
as BusinessEurope, is the collective body of member states’
employers’ groups (the UK’s representative being the CBI and
Ireland’s representative being the IBEC) [155,156] and, hence,
BAT was linked into UNICE via its membership of the CBI.
There is no evidence to suggest BAT was a direct member of the
IBEC, but both the IBEC and the CBI were members of UNICE,
and the documents indicate that Stuart Chalfen, of BAT, held a
post in UNICE circa 1996 [157–159]. Efforts focused on Member
States predisposed to favour IA/CBA, such as the UK and
Germany [62,87,99,140,144,145,160], as well as Ireland and The
Netherlands, which consecutively held the EU Presidency during
the IGC (see Table 3) [57,59,98,99,136,161]. Both the EPC [162]
and UNICE [163] made direct submissions to the IGC that called
for CBA to be made legally binding. Although it is possible that
some of the groups involved in this ‘‘policy network,’’ particularly
UNICE, which was already supportive of CBA in 1995 [164],
might have attempted to promote IA/CBA even without BAT’s
involvement, the EPC appears to have played an important
coordinating role during the IGC, helping to ensure that lobbying
was carefully directed through a range of organisations and
member-states.
Changes to the EU Treaty indicate that these large-scale
lobbying efforts were effective ([62,165]; interview with Stanley
Crossick on 18th September 2008). In what was described by BAT
as an ‘‘important victory’’ for the company [62] (see Box 1), a
Protocol, entitled Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity
and proportionality and tabled by the UK delegation [166], was
appended to the Treaty of Amsterdam [39]. This included
provisions calling on the European Commission to ‘‘consult
widely’’ and minimise the potential ‘‘burden’’ of policy changes on
‘‘economic operators’’ (and others). This appears to have been
interpreted by the EPC and BAT to mean that a form of BIA was
now mandatory within EU policymaking [62].
Embedding the Treaty Changes within Policymaking
Processes
The central role of the UK government. Our analysis
suggests that continued political activity around RA and IA was
deemed essential by BAT and the EPC to embedding the
Protocol’s principles in the EU policymaking process as the
companies involved were uncertain how officials would interpret
the Protocol [167]. Documents show that the Treaty change was
therefore used to enhance lobbying activities and encourage other
companies to join the campaign to promote RA and IA [168].
Since the UK submitted the Protocol and was perceived as the
Member State most committed to IA, the UK’s assumption of
the EU Presidency for six months from January 1998 was
regarded as an important ‘‘window of opportunity’’ [165]. As part
of its strategy to guide officials’ approach to IA and RA, BAT
helped organise a conference (in April 1998), assisted by the
EPC and Weinberg Group and supported by other companies
[84,103,112,116,135,168–172]. Seemingly drawing on the Amer-
ican campaign to redefine RA, BAT recruited Steve Milloy as a
keynote speaker [173,174]. Milloy was Executive Director of The
Advancement of Sound Science Coalition (TASSC), which was
linked to Philip Morris’ campaign to discredit scientific findings
that were not in its interests [73], as part of efforts to denigrate the
Table 3. Timeline of six-month rotating EU Presidencies during and immediately after the 1996–1997 Inter-governmental
Conference.
Event Dates EU Presidency
In 1996 an IGC (the formal name for Member State discussions concerning potential changes to the EU Treaty) was
launched in Turin, Italy. After more than 18 months of discussions, and four different EU Presidencies, the IGC
eventually culminated in the Treaty of Amsterdam, which was officially signed on 2nd October 1997.
Jan–Jun1996 Italy
Jul–Dec 1996 Ireland
Jan–Jun 1997 Netherlands
Jul–Dec 1997 Luxembourg
Once the Treaty change had been secured in the Treaty of Amsterdam, BAT focused on organising (with the EPC
and Weinberg Group) a conference, sponsored by the UK EU Presidency, to further promote RA and IA. This event
was used to target Austrian officials (as well as others), as Austria was about to take over the EU Presidency.
Jan–Jun 1998 UK
Jul–Dec 1998 Austria
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000202.t003
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Box 1. Extracts from an Internal BAT Document [62] Outlining BAT’s Influence on the Treaty of
Amsterdam (Italics Indicate Our Emphasis)
The objective
To promote the introduction of legislation which forces governments to justify properly and openly the costs and benefits of their proposals.
In particular, to require governments to undertake a transparent and rigorous assessment of the risks that they are seeking to eliminate:
- For a public smoking ban, government must show a convincing case for the claim that ETS is harmful to the health of non-
smokers and that a ban would deliver significant health benefits
- For an advertising ban, government must show a convincing case for the claim that bans reduce the incidence of smoking,
including youth smoking.
The opportunity
In no country in the world are governments required, in practice, to justify their actions through effective cost-benefit analysis,
underpinned by rigorous risk assessment. An opportunity to promote such a requirement was identified in the European Union (EU).
The Treaty of the EU does not currently contain any general requirement that government authorities carry out a cost-benefit
analysis or structured risk assessment before imposing legislation. However, the EU Treaty was re-negotiated in June 1997 at
the Intergovernmental Conference.
British American Tobacco and BAT Industries recognised that a broad coalition of like-minded companies might be able to persuade
member states into amending the Treaty, imposing a binding requirement for cost benefit analysis and risk assessment.
The strategy
British American Tobacco and B.A.T Industries assembled a group of companies with a common interest in rigorous cost benefit
analysis and risk assessment.
Supported by a public affairs consultant (European Policy Centre) and a technical consultancy (Weinberg Group), this ad hoc
group of companies used its contacts and influence to promote the cause of cost benefit analysis and risk assessment.
Throughout late 1996 and 1997, the campaign gained momentum through lobbies of member state governments, companies,
trade organisations, the European Commission and others.
Germany, the UK, Ireland and the Netherlands (who held the EU Presidency) were identified as the key players and lobbying focused
on interests in those states. […]
The outcome
The new Treaty of the EU includes a (legally binding) Protocol on subsidiarity (the need to push decision making as far down as
possible). Chapter 9 states: Without prejudice to its right of initiative, the Commission should:
- Except in cases of particular urgency or confidentiality, consult widely before proposing legislation and wherever appropriate,
publish consultation documents:
- justify the relevance of its proposals with regard to the principle of subsidiarity; whenever necessary, the explanatory
memorandum accompanying a proposal will give details in this respect. The financing of Community action in the whole or in
part from the Community budget shall require an explanation;
- take duly into account the need for any burden, whether financial or administrative, falling upon the Community, national
governments, local authorities, economic operators and citizens to be minimised and proportionate to the objective to be achieved;
- submit an annual report to the European Council, the Council and the European Parliament on the application of Article 3b
of the Treaty. This annual report shall also be sent to the Committee of the Regions and to the Economic and Social Committee.
So, the Commission must now take into account the financial and administrative burden (cost), which has to be minimised and
proportionate to the objective (benefit).
Next steps (in Europe)
A framework now exists in the EU which demands cost benefit analysis and risk assessment.
The new Treaty comes into force in January 1999. Between now and then it is vital that pressure is kept up to ensure that the EU does
not get off the hook and that the new Protocol is translated into a meaningful system of regulation. There are two areas of focus:
- To promote the wider acceptance and understanding of the need for structured risk assessment as part of a cost benefit
analysis regime
- To ensure that the Commission introduces measures which clearly, efficiently and reliably deliver on the Treaty’s promise.
Strategy discussions are continuing with the other companies. For example, seminars on risk assessment for legislators,
business interests and others are already being planned, with particular advantage being taken of the British presidency in early
1998. Also being developed are plans to input at every opportunity to the Commission’s development of cost benefit analysis
and risk assessment practices. […]
Next steps at British American Tobacco
British American Tobacco has achieved an important victory in a key trade bloc. A priority should now be to encourage and
empower other parts of the world to embark on similar exercises.
Science and Regulation propose developing a best practice tool which explains the benefits to British American Tobacco
markets of achieving a government requirement for rigorous cost benefit analysis and structured risk assessment. It will also
detail the goals, approach, strategy and outcomes of the European campaign, as an example of what can be achieved.
Our company has an enormous amount to gain from soundly based regulatory environments. The achievements that have been
realised in the EU provide an important stepping stone.’’ [62]
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Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) approach to RA [66],
and which BAT had also begun to work with in 1997 [175–177].
Despite the fact that BAT played a substantial role in the
conference [173,178–181], its involvement appears to have
remained well hidden [116,117,182–184], particularly as the
UK’s EU Presidency appears to have been persuaded to officially
sponsor the event (by officially sanctioning it, rather than
providing funding, which BAT had already agreed to pay [185])
[135,186,187].
In supporting the conference, the UK government provided
crucial political legitimacy to BAT’s campaign for regulatory
reform. The role of David Clark MP, who as Chancellor for the
Duchy of Lancaster between May 1997 and late 1998, was the
minister responsible for regulatory reform in the UK, appears to
have been central. Clark was already well-known to BAT by the
time he was appointed to this ministerial position [188–196]. Before
1992, Clark had several meetings with BAT representatives
[188,190,191] and, following a June 1992 BAT Chairman’s Policy
Committee, the minutes of which note that Clark ‘‘would be
appointed as a political advisor to the Company’’ [197], Clark
attended several high-level BAT meetings [185,189,192–194]. In
1995, a BAT member of staff reported in an internal memo that
Clark had offered to lobby other MPs on issues relating to economic
impact studies on BAT’s behalf [198], suggesting that by the time
Clark entered the Cabinet in May 1997 he was not only aware of
BAT’s interest in IA but appeared to be supportive of the company.
It is unclear whether or not Clark was specifically aware of BAT’s
involvement in the April 1998 UK Conference although shortly
prior to this conference, Stuart Chalfen (of BAT) had written to
Clark requesting ‘‘a little time together’’ [157] at another conference
on regulatory issues organised by Clark [199], at which Chalfen had
been invited to speak [157,158]. Whether or not Clark knew of
BAT’s involvement in the April conference, he agreed to support
the conference [168,200] and was also involved in other efforts to
promote regulatory reform during the EU Presidency [201]. Bruce
Ballantine (of EPC [202]) was involved with one or more key
advisory groups organised by Clark, one of which was described as a
task force on ‘‘open government,’’ designed to feed into a white
paper on regulatory reform [135], and another which was referred
to as the ‘‘Better Government Task Force,’’ into which Ballantine
offered to feed comments from the Forum [203] (it is unclear
whether or not these groups were one and the same).
The Fair Regulation Campaign. Additionally, the docu-
ments show that BAT and other companies came together to form
the UK-based Fair Regulation Campaign (FRC) in January 1999,
with the stated intentions of: (i) ensuring that BIA for all policy
initiatives proposed by the UK government, the EU, or associated
regulatory bodies was legally required (and monitored); and (ii)
maximising consultation with business in relation to BIA
(including on methodology and data) [204,205]. At least two
internal BAT documents provide evidence of BAT providing
financial support to the FRC [206,207]. The Director of the FRC
was Charles Miller of PPU [204,208–211], a consultancy company
with which BAT had extensive links [97,160,212,213]. The
creation of another, ostensibly unrelated, constituency lobbying
for regulatory reform is likely to have further obfuscated BAT’s
specific interests and enhanced the credibility of the campaign.
The FRC quickly won the support of Erkki Liikanen (then
Commissioner for Enterprise and Information) [209,214–216] and
a number of other Commissioners who were involved in the
‘‘Better Regulation’’ impetus in Europe (interview with Charles
Miller on 27th August 2008).
From BIA to consultation with stakeholders. Com-
missioner Liikanen went on to oversee a pilot study of the BIA
process in Europe [217] for which EPC was commissioned to
produce a contributory paper. Published in September 2001 [218]
the EPC paper argued that the system for undertaking IAs in the
European Commission was inadequate and that a lack of
stakeholder consultation was a key concern, a theme taken up in
the subsequent BIA pilot study report that recommended ‘‘Key
minimum standards for consultation should be implemented for all
consultation activities that include dialogues with stakeholders and
interested parties’’ [219]. The EPC paper acknowledges that
Christopher Proctor (who was by then BAT’s head of science and
regulation) had acted as Chair of the EPC’s Risk Forum Steering
Group and that the Forum had been significantly involved in
producing the report [218]. In what appears to be a direct
response to the recommendation for consultation standards (as
well as a broader reaction to a 1999 scandal in which 20
Commissioners resigned over allegations of nepotism and
corruption [220]) the European Commission subsequently
published minimum standards of consultation [221], which took
effect on 1st January 2003.
Subsequent Industry Use of IA within Europe
The tobacco industry has already used IA commitments and the
requirement for stakeholder consultation to actively challenge EU
tobacco control legislation in a number of ways. In the case of the
EU’s Tobacco Products Directive, the industry argued that both
the European Commission and the UK government failed to
conduct adequate IAs [222–224]. In the UK, the Tobacco
Manufacturers’ Association, of which BAT is a leading member,
responded to the official draft regulatory impact assessment
(RIA) by providing alternative (higher) compliance costs [225]
and claiming that the government failed to consult properly
[223,224]. BAT itself took a similar approach in a report it
produced which overplayed the potential job losses (and related
economic costs) associated with this legislation [226]. This
approach echoed similar challenges to the UK’s implementation
of EU legislation restricting tobacco advertising [142,227–229],
which resulted in the then Minister for Public Health being called
before the European Legislation Select Committee [142,228,230]
and a full RIA being subsequently published, which BAT and its
allies then challenged [231–240]. More recently, tobacco compa-
nies have been using the requirement for stakeholder consultation
laid out in the European Commission’s minimum standards on
consultation [221] and IA guidelines [241,242] to lobby against
Article 5.3 of the World Health Organisation’s Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control [243–246] (the Framework
Convention is a global health treaty, which the EU has signed and
ratified, and Article 5.3 specifically seeks to protect public health
policies from tobacco industry interference [247]). Imperial
Tobacco has recently employed very similar arguments to lobby
against Article 5.3 in the UK [248].
Whilst these attempts so far appear only to have delayed EU
tobacco control legislation, not to have prevented or significantly
weakened it, several of our interviewees (both those who were
involved in the lobbying campaign described in this paper and
those working for public health and environmental NGOs) stated
that similar strategies were more likely to succeed now that IA has
been further embedded within EU systems. Importantly, these
claims are supported by the fact the chemical industry, which was
also involved in the campaign described in this paper, has more
recently used the EU’s IA system to successfully delay and weaken
legislation intended to protect the public’s health and the
environment (see Box 2). The most recent IA-based challenge by
a tobacco company (of which we are aware) was to write to
the Chairman of the European Commission’s internal Impact
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Assessment Board in July 2008 to complain that the IA on smoke-
free environments, which has yet to be published, did not fully
comply with the European Commission’s IA guidelines and that
the process of stakeholder consultation was inadequate [245]. This
issue is ongoing and it remains to be seen whether tobacco
companies’ IA-based lobbying will influence developments.
In the meantime, lobbying efforts relating to regulatory reforms
are ongoing [21,249,250]. The EPC, of which BAT and other
tobacco companies remain members [134], are increasingly, and
apparently successfully [18], depicting the precautionary principle
as inconsistent with scientific approaches to policymaking [21,250].
Discussion
Key Findings
Our findings indicate that, having monitored a similar
campaign by Philip Morris in the US [63,66], senior managers
at BAT initiated a large-scale, multifaceted lobbying campaign in
Europe that quickly helped secure an important and legally
binding amendment to the EU Treaty, providing a constitutional
platform for BIA to be embedded within EU policymaking
procedures—changes that a BAT document describes as an
‘‘important victory’’ for the company [62]. Subsequent lobbying
efforts appear to have helped promote and embed a system of IA
in the EU that is business orientated, subsuming RA within it and
encouraging policymakers to consult businesses. We conclude that,
in doing so, BAT and other large companies operating in Europe
have fundamentally altered EU policymaking by ensuring that all
decisions are passed through an economic framework that
provides business with a range of advantages [251].
To achieve the reforms it desired, BAT appears to have
specifically recruited other industries (sometimes directly and
sometimes through the EPC) that, by virtue of the hazardous
nature of their products, shared an interest in challenging the
precautionary principle as a basis for regulation. In other words,
BAT deliberately helped manufacture a ‘‘policy network’’ to
enhance the extent to which the regulatory reforms it wanted to
promote would appear credible (and not partisan), with the
intention of increasing the likelihood that these reforms would be
successfully implemented. In addition, by operating through a
major think tank (the EPC) and a purposefully established
campaign group (the FRC), BAT seems to have been able to
distance itself from the push for IA and RA. The fact that our
interviews with European Commission staff revealed no awareness
of tobacco industry involvement in campaigns for IA (or of the
extent to which business interests may be privileged through IA)
corroborates claims, made elsewhere [252,253], that policymakers
may be unaware of how changes to policy are taking effect or who
is behind them, an issue which may be particularly pertinent in the
EU, which is a complex political system with multiple points of
access [139].
As BAT and other companies in the EPC Forum planned
[161,254], there has been a significant shift in how risk is
conceptualised within Europe, which has helped effect a move
away from the precautionary principle towards IA [18] and towards
the individualisation of risk [255]. These changes are particularly
concerning given that BAT’s intention was to prevent legislation
intended to protect the public’s health. As this paper illustrates,
these reforms have already been employed to challenge legislation
intended to protect public health. If regulatory reforms continue to
move in this direction, as many, including our interviewees, have
predicted [18,256], there is a real danger that the burden of proof
will shift further towards those trying to manage risks and away from
those who profit from the production and sale of risky goods. Our
interview data indicate that to date corporate actors have not yet
challenged EU legislation in the courts on the primary basis that the
Box 2. Chemical Industry Use of IA to Delay and Weaken EU Legislation Intended to Protect Public
Health
To date, chemical companies appear to have been more successful than tobacco companies at employing IA in the EU, having
employed IA to delay and weaken EU regulation on the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemical
Substances (REACH) [273]. Given mounting evidence of the strong link between chemical products and degenerative diseases
of the central nervous system and cancers [274–278], REACH, which is underpinned by the precautionary principle, is potentially
one of the most important pieces of legislation ever passed by the EU. The intention was that it would reverse the burden of
proof, making companies (rather than regulators) responsible for providing data to support safety claims (including for
chemicals already in use), and require mandatory substitution for some of the most hazardous chemicals on the market.
However, the chemical industry was able to dilute key aspects of the proposed regulation, including the requirement for
mandatory substitution of hazardous chemicals [279], and there is evidence that the European chemical industry’s use of IAs
played a crucial role in this process.
After the European Commission launched an internet consultation on REACH in May 2003, the industry contracted a number of
consultants to produce IAs as a way of challenging some of the proposals [280,281]. These IAs greatly exaggerated the costs
associated of the proposed legislation and, although this was recognised [282], they have nevertheless been credited with
shaping policymakers’ perceptions of the prospective costs and benefits of REACH [283–285]. More significantly, the industry’s
wide use of consultancy firms to undertake IAs on its behalf [283] meant the independence of many of the firms with
experience in conducting large-scale IAs in Europe was compromised, restricting the choices available to EU institutions, which
did not at that time have sufficient resources to conduct an IA on REACH internally. Hence, when DG Research commissioned
Arthur D. Little (ADL) (a company with a history of working for the tobacco industry [10,286–290]) to produce an official IA [291],
the company was already working on an IA for the German chemical industry [292]. ADL’s report for the European Commission
used the same parameters and methods of calculation as its report for the German industry and estimated costs to the industry
to be somewhere between 300 and 600 times greater than the most conservative estimates of the European Commission
[291,293]. Despite serious questions over the reliability of this IA [282,293] intense corporate lobbying [294] subsequently led to
a Memorandum of Understanding between the industry, DG Enterprise, and DG Environment [295], which effectively resulted in
three industry sponsored IAs [296–298] being incorporated within the European Commission’s IA framework [299,300]. To
ensure confidence in the process, a number of NGOs were invited to join a working group designed to monitor these IAs but, in
July 2004, two withdrew their support, claiming that the study methods lacked transparency, were inconsistent and
imbalanced, and placed undue focus on business risks [294].
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IA process was insufficient. Nor have business-sponsored IAs yet
been widely used to challenge existing (rather than forthcoming)
legislation. However, interviews with business lobbyists and analysis
of BAT documents [91,257,258] suggest that both potentialities are
under consideration.
Overall, the evidence presented here supports key concerns
previously raised about IA. It shows that, in practice, IA is far from
the transparent and rational process described by advocates and
can instead serve to enhance corporate influence over health
policy, as the material from IMPACT cited in this paper explicitly
describes [91]. Indeed, its incorporation into EU decision-making
has been promoted by major European businesses for this very
reason [256]. The findings therefore help explain why indepen-
dent assessments of the European Commission’s IAs have
consistently found that economic impacts have received more
attention than environmental [43,44] or social (and particularly
health) impacts [43–47,259].
Implications for Public Health and Policymakers
Given that contemporary public health problems are increas-
ingly being linked to the activities of large corporations, our
findings have important consequences for public health. First, they
confirm that corporate influence over health policy can extend
well beyond the immediate remit of a particular sector’s product;
public health groups and policymakers therefore need to give more
attention to corporate efforts to shape decision-making processes
as well as specific outcomes. In the current European context, and
in light of the ambitions of some of the companies involved,
further analysis is required to explore how large corporations are
attempting to reframe debates about risk and the costs of
legislation.
Second, the findings suggest the public health community’s
positive acceptance of IA (focusing on HIA) [260,261] ought to be
reconsidered [251]. This is particularly important in the context of
the private sector’s well-documented ability to use its resource
advantage to shape both scientific knowledge and public
understandings of science by consistently challenging the method
of robust scientific studies and by misrepresenting the findings of
industry-funded science [262–266]. In light of these factors, it is
important to consider whether tools such as IA and CBA are
inevitably flawed from the perspective of those interested in
maximising human (or environmental) well-being, as some have
claimed [26,27], or whether it is possible to employ IA tools in
ways that do not systematically advantage corporate interests.
Further, comparative research is required to investigate this issue
by exploring whether IA processes are prioritising business
interests (and underplaying health impacts) to the same extent
elsewhere. In the meantime, a review of the current system of IA
operating in the EU is urgently required. One possible starting
point would be for the European Commission to reopen the
relatively short consultation period for its most recent guidelines
on IA, which ran between June and July 2008 [267], and to ensure
that this is now more widely publicised. Finally, given that the EU
Treaty also requires the EU to ‘‘ensure a high level of human
health protection’’ in all its activities, perhaps it is time for the
public health community to officially challenge the European
Commission’s failure to undertake HIAs of its policies [45].
Combined, these issues underline the need for public health
groups in Europe to have better information from, and
representation in, Brussels given the important influence that
EU developments will have on national public health policy.
Moreover, in light of the apparent success of BAT’s attempts to
influence EU policy by establishing a pan-industry ‘‘policy
network,’’ our results suggest that it may be more effective, and
efficient, for different interest public health groups to collaborate
more closely in their efforts to influence policy.
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Editors’ Summary
Background. The primary goal of public health, the branch
of medicine concerned with the health of communities, is to
improve lives by preventing disease. Public-health groups do
this by assessing and monitoring the health of communities,
by ensuring that populations have access to appropriate and
cost-effective health care, and by helping to formulate public
policies that safeguard human health. Until recently, most of
the world’s major public-health concerns related to infectious
diseases. Nowadays, however, many major public-health
concerns are linked to the goods made and marketed by
large corporations such as fast food, alcohol, tobacco, and
chemicals. In Europe, these corporations are regulated by
policies drawn up both by member states and by the
European Commission, the executive organ of the European
Union (EU; an economic and political partnership among 27
democratic European countries). Thus, for example, the
tobacco industry, which is widely recognized as a driver of
the smoking epidemic, is regulated by Europe-wide tobacco
control policies and member state level policies.
Why Was This Study Done? Since 1997, the European
Commission has been required by law to assess the
economic, social (including health), and environmental
consequences of new policy initiatives using a process
called an ‘‘impact assessment’’ (IA). Because different types
of IA examine the likely effects of policies on different
aspects of daily life—a health impact assessment, for
example, focuses on a policy’s effect on health—the choice
of IA can lead to different decisions being taken about new
policies. Although the IA tool adopted by the European
Commission aims to assess economic, environmental and
social impacts, independent experts suggest this tool does
not adequately assess health impacts. Instead, economic
impacts receive the most attention, a situation that may
favour the interests of large businesses. In this study, the
researchers seek to identify how and why the EU’s approach
to IA developed. More specifically, the researchers analyze
internal documents from British American Tobacco (BAT),
which have been disclosed because of US litigation cases, to
find out whether industry has played a role in promoting the
EU’s system of IA.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? The researchers
analyzed 714 BAT internal documents (identified by
searching the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library, which
contains more than 10 million internal tobacco company
documents) that concerned attempts made by BAT to
influence regulatory reforms in Europe. They also analyzed
related literature from other sources (for example, academic
publications) and interviewed 16 relevant people (including
people who had worked at the European Commission). This
analysis shows that from 1995, BAT worked with other
businesses to promote European regulatory reforms (in
particular, the establishment of a business-orientated form of
IA) that favor large corporations. A lobbying campaign,
initiated by BAT but involving a ‘‘policy network’’ of other
companies, first helped to secure binding changes to the EU
Treaty that require policymakers to minimize legislative
burdens on businesses. The analysis shows that after
achieving this goal, which BAT described as an ‘‘important
victory,’’ further lobbying ensured that these treaty changes
were translated into the implementation of a business-
orientated form of IA within the EU. Both the tobacco
industry and the chemical industry, the researchers argue,
have since used the IA to delay and/or weaken EU legislation
intended to protect public health.
What Do These Findings Mean? These findings suggest
that BAT and its corporate allies have fundamentally altered
the way in which EU policy is made by ensuring that all
significant EU policy decisions have to be assessed using a
business-orientated IA. As the authors note, this situation
increases the likelihood that the EU will produce policies that
favor big business rather than the health of its citizens.
Furthermore, these findings suggest that by establishing a
network of other industries to help in lobbying for EU Treaty
changes, BAT was able to distance itself from the push to
establish a business-orientated IA to the extent that
Commission officials were unaware of the involvement of
the tobacco industry in campaigns for IA. Thus, in future, to
safeguard public health, policymakers and public-health
groups must pay more attention to corporate efforts to
shape decision-making processes. In addition, public-health
groups must take account of the ways in which IA can be
used to undermine as well as support effective public-health
policies and they must collaborate more closely in their
efforts to ensure effective national and international policy.
Additional Information. Please access these Web sites via
the online version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/0.
1371/journal.pmed.1000202.
N Wikipedia has a page on public health (note that Wikipedia
is a free online encyclopedia that anyone can edit; available
in several languages)
N More information on the European Union (in several
languages), on public health in the European Union, and
on impact assessment by the European Commission is
available
N The Legacy Tobacco Documents Library is a public,
searchable database of tobacco company internal docu-
ments detailing their advertising, manufacturing, market-
ing, sales, and scientific activities
N The World Health Organization provides information about
the dangers of tobacco (in several languages)
N The Smoke Free Partnership contains more information
about smoking prevalence in Europe and about European
policies to tackle the public health issues associated with
tobacco use
N For more information about tobacco industry influence on
policy see the 2009 World Health Organization report on
tobacco industry interference with tobacco control
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